Similar Search Results

Political Economy, Information and Incentives.

Laffont, J.-J. - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et … - 1999

This paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639380

Allocating and Funding Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Network Market.

Chone, P.; Flochel, L.; Perrot, A. - 1999

We examine, in a network market open to competition, various mechanisms of allocation and funding for "universal service obligations". The obligations we consider are geographic "ubiquity" and non discrimination. We analyze, both from an efficiency and an equity point of views the respective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005780810

Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland

Benz, Matthias; Stutzer, Alois - 2004

Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114473

On Robust Constitution Design

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504542

Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland

Benz, Matthias; Alois Stutzer: - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463547

Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice : Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks

Joskow, Paul L. - 2006

Modern theoretical principles to govern the design of incentive regulation mechanisms are reviewed and discussed … incentive regulation mechanisms to the regulation of prices and service quality for "unbundled" transmission and distribution … networks are presented and discussed. Evidence regarding the performance of incentive regulation in practice for electric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061352

The Brennan-Lomasky test of expressive voting: When impressive probability differences are meaningless

Clark, J. R.; Lee, Dwight R. - In: Economies 6 (2018) 3, pp. 1-6

We consider a test of expressive voting developed by Brennan and Lomasky (1993). They point out that in presidential elections the probability of a tie, and casting a decisive vote, increases 'multi-billionfold' as the election becomes increasingly close. They conjecture that if voters are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012009841

Electoral Systems and the Influence of the Median Voter: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Portmann, Marco; Eichenberger, Reiner; Stadelmann, David - 2010

When moving from a plurality rule to a proportional system, members of national parliament have more incentives to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271428

Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences

Panunzi, Fausto; Pavoni, Nicola; Tabellini, Guido - 2020

This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxes between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. As in prospect theory, economically disappointed voters bcome risk lovers, and hence are intrinsically attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that, after a large adverse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314826

Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries

Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - 2013

We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest - which we call a 'tax lottery' - can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312844

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last