L'apprentissage a ete largement impulse en France, comme un des moyens de reduire le chomage des jeunes. Notre objectif est de comparer l'[acces au premier emploi des appretis et des lyceens et, en particulier, les durees de chomage avant l'obtention du premier emploi en tenant compte de...

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelation of information in Dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is based on the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships. Consequently, debt debt encourages a privately informed party to...

Using a Principal-Agent framework, this paper analyzes a public good provision problem in which a central government tries to favor one of the regions or political reasons. We show how this favoritism leads the government to distort the allocation scheme compared to the benevolent case. We then...

In this paper, we develop a continuous time duopoly model of irreversible investment under uncertainty, where each player may learn about the profitability of an investment by observing the experience of his rival, as well as some costless background information. We show that the resulting war...

We show that a regulator can use diffuse information held by potential entrants in the market as a powerful incentive instrument even when neither government tranfers to firms nor the regulation of entrants is permitted. Optimal regulation involves a menu of price caps and price floors. The...

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a leveraged company to shut it down in a continuous time, stochastic environment. Keeping the firm as an ongoing concern has an option value but equity and debt holders value it differently. Equityholders' decisions exhibit excessive...