This paper estimates depth of reasoning in an Iterative Best Response model using data from Weber (<CitationRef CitationID="CR20">2003</CitationRef>) ten-period repeated guessing game with no feedback. Different mixture models are estimated and the type (Level-0, Level-1, etc) of each player is determined in every round using the...</citationref>

Group differences are often associated with increased political mobilization. Yet group identification is surprisingly flexible and opportunistic. This paper reconciles these two findings by modeling group identification in terms of behavioral interdependencies between a rational agent and those...

Levine and Palfrey's QRE account of turnout in large elections raises the broader question of how much of a departure from standard rational choice theory is justified by the considerable repertoire of rational choice anomalies that has accumulated since Downs and Olson half a century ago. An...

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...

This paper examines the implementation of various solutions in differentiable concave production economies with one privately owned input, one output, and publicly owned production technology. The public ownership solutions we focus on are the Proportional Solution (PS) and the Equal Benefit...