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Consider an agent who collects information over time, but who imperfectly recalls the date at which he made each observation. If the state of nature changes over time, then the agent's performance may worsen with experience.
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This paper estimates the probability distribution of budgets, revenues, returns and profits to G-, PG-, PG13-, and R-rated movies. The distributions are non-Gaussian and show a self-similar stable Paretian form with non-finite variance and non-stationary mean.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486841
The core of the argument offered here is that the trade off between these two choices boils down to a benefit cost calculation rather than a Bergsonian or Arrovian value judgement: i.e., in return for the net benefits which a society obtains from the productive, public good supplying activities...
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We derive declining exponential rent and density functions for a monocentric city form a new set of assumptions, which place restrictions on commuting costs rather than on the demand for land.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486844
Market augmentation is Olson's description for correcting market failure. Public good benefit is shared by all, private free-rider riven efforts to supply it will always be insufficient and sub-optimal. In sum, "market augmentation" is essentially and necessarily a collective, government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486845
This paper analyzes the idea that political opposition to a tax increases with two factors: 1) the amount of tax that would be owed if consumers did not reduce their consumption of the taxed good, and 2) the consumer surplus consumers would enjoy in the absence of the tax.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486846
We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, as by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. We find that both when politicians do and do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486847