If worker performance is observable and contractible without cost, then why do we observe "Spencian", unproductive, education? We provide the following explanation. Say that the economy consists of several different sectors, and that agents are uncertain which of these sectors they are best fit...

This paper analyses the relationship between the size of jurisdictions and the degree of redistribution. A simple political economy model with cross-border shopping and limited and impure altruism is developed in order to study how the size of jurisdictions affects both the cost of...

Through a learning-by-doing process, a firm's efficiency depends positively on the extent of its previous business activity. From a dynamic incentives perspective, therefore, efficiency is endogenous. In addition, the efficiency of the firm is likely to be subject to private information. The...

This paper focuses on the location effects of preferential trade areas (PTA) on non-members. More specifically, using a CGE model calibrated to real data, it focuses on the impact of tighter European integration on outsider regions. We argue that because theoretical models analysing PTAs have...

We use matched firm - worker panel data from France and Norway to consider observationally equivalent alternatives to the hypothesis that firms share product market rents with their workers in the form of higher wages.