We study the dynamic equilibrium behavior of security prices in an economy where nonfundamental risk arises from agents' heterogeneous beliefs about extraneous processes. We provide a complete characteriszation of equilibrium in terms of the primitives of the economy, via construction of a...

In nonconvex environments, a sunspot equilibrium can sometimes be destroyed by the introduction of new extrinsic information. We provide a simple test for determining whether or not a particular equilibrium survives, or is robust to all, all possible refinements fo the state space.

In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. Intuitively, this equilibrium concept models the possible steady states of a learning...

We show in a differential game of a differentiated product doupoly model of price competition with costly production adjustment that when firms are symmetric the leadership attempt by each firm turns into Stackelberg price warfare yielding a (MArkov perfect) steady state outcome more competitive...