Suppose that a seller and a buyer have private valuations for a good and that their respective utilities from a trading mechanism are given by u(subscript 's') and u(subscript 'b'). Consider the problem of maximizing E[('lambda')u(subscript 's') + (1 - 'lambda')u(subscript 'b')] for some weight...

This paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. The authors prove that, as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero, all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria. This reverses a...

This paper analyzes a class of alternating-offer bargaining games with one-sided incomplete information for the case of "no gap." If sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity, monotonicity, pure strategies, and no free screening, the authors...

This paper generalizes the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge (1963)) to allow for discontinuous changes in the domain and the objective function. It also provides a geometrical version of the (generalized) theorem.

This paper presents a general model of the demand for differentiated products which has as special cases two popular models used to analyze welfare and competition in monopolistically competitive markets: the model of spatial competition and the symmetric aggregate benefit function approach. The...

In this paper, the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of J. P. Benoit and V. Krishna (1987) in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition. Benoit and Krishna established that all firms carry excess...

This paper analyzes duopolistic price-leadership games in which firms have capacity constraints. The authors show that when capacities are in the range where the simultaneous-move price-setting game (with efficiently rationed demand) yields a mixed-strategy solution the large firm is indifferent...

This paper analyzes a duopolistic price setting game in which firms have loyal consumer segments but cannot distinguish them from price-sensitive consumers. The authors adapt a variant of H. Varian's (1980) simultaneous price setting game to analyze price-leader equilibria. The properties of the...

A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy for the reported preferences. When payoffs are linear in money...

Does consumer behavior exhibit time inconsistency? This is an essential, yet difficult question to answer. This dissertation attempts to answer this question based on a large-scale randomized experiment in the credit card market. Specifically,we apply both time consistent preferences...