The authors study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping generations model with short-lived governments. The successive governments--who care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributions--are unable to precommit the...

In industries with imperfect consumer information, the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis established firms. The authors consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant...

The authors study the disclosure of information about product characteristics as part of firms' competitive strategy. A model of a differentiated products duopoly is constructed in which firms may choose whether or not t o reveal the attributes of their product to consumers with heterogeneous...

The authors develop a model in which special-interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. The interest groups bid for protection with their campaign support. Politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on total...