A rarely studied trend in corporate governance is the increasing tendency to fill CEO openings through external hires rather than through internal promotions: Kevin J. Murphy and Ján Zábojník (2004) show that the proportion of outside hires has doubled and their pay premium almost quadrupled...

A rarely studied trend in corporate governance is the increasing tendency to fill CEO openings through external hires rather than through internal promotions: Kevin J. Murphy and Jaacute;n Zaacute;bojniacute;k (2004) show that the proportion of outside hires has doubled and their pay premium almost...

A rarely studied trend in corporate governance is the increasing tendency to fill CEO openings through external hires rather than through internal promotions: Kevin J. Murphy and Ján Zábojník (2004) show that the proportion of outside hires has doubled and their pay premium almost quadrupled...

A long-standing controversy is whether CEO employment contracts insulate inferior managers from discipline leading to shareholder wealth destruction, or whether contracts alleviate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-enhancing decisions. Using a unique dataset on S&P 500 CEO employment...

We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and the legal sector. Then, using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use long-term compensation. We find that individuals with jobs that make them highly visible and that...

Part 2D.2 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) regulates the making of termination payments to company directors, with the aim of limiting or preventing companies from giving golden parachutes. Termination payments are prohibited unless they have shareholder approval, or they fall within...

We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and CEO horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their...

We examine whether companies select compensation peer groups opportunistically to increase CEO pay. Using 608 firms from the Samp;P 1500, 2,154 peer firms identified from their proxy statements, and a pool of potential peers representing the firm's labor market in which it competes for talent,...

The primary way in which directors obtain necessary information is by attending board meetings. Bank directors, in particular, are strongly urged to attend meetings by regulators. We investigate whether such pressure is sufficient for bank directors to have good attendance records. Using data on...

Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996-2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance...