This paper defies the widely held belief concerning the unambiguous superiority of negligence in settings of judgment proofness. We analyze a set-up with bilateral harm, bilateral care, and potential judgment proofness by one party to the accident. We establish that strict liability with a...

In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we...

This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer...

This paper allows for avoidance activities in the accident setting and analyzes how this affects the evaluation of uncertain due care standards and of different negligence conceptions from an efficiency perspective. Importantly, our analysis also shows that punitive damages, i.e., damages above...

In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we...

This paper considers the case that potential victims affect each other by taking care. Analyzing standard liability rules, we show that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is in the best position to induce the efficient outcome, i.e., this liability rule ensures efficiency...