When individuals compare themselves to those with the same wage-rate, status concerns–Keeping up with the Joneses–lead individuals to work who otherwise would have chosen not to, and, for them, well-being is a decreasing function of the wage rate.

A generic Negotiation Game (NG) is used to model a conflict between two parties seeking to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. NG is a 2 × 2 non-constant-sum symmetric game that is `generic' in the sense that its payoffs, which are assumed to be cardinal, are only incompletely...

The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations...

Whenever a common resource is scarce, a set of rules are needed to share it in a fairly way. However, most control schemes assume that users will behave in a cooperative way, without taking care of guaranteeing that they will not act in a selfish manner. Then, a fundamental issue is to evaluate...

It is suggested that thermodynamical equilibrium equals game theoretical equilibrium. Aspects of this thesis are discussed. The philosophy is consistent with maximum entropy thinking of Jaynes, but goes one step deeper by deriving the maximum entropy principle from an underlying game theoretical...

Answering to an open question of Herings et al. (see [3]), one extends their fixed point theorem to mappings defined on convex compact subset of Rn, and not only polytopes. Such extension is important in non-cooperative game theory, where typical strategy sets are convex and compact. An...

Properties of an average voting rule - the outcome being some weighted average of votes – are investigated, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. The unique average voting outcome is characterized with a median formula which depends on the voters’ preferred...

I study a regulatory process in which both the regulator and the regulated firm propose prices that in case of disagreement are settled through final-offer arbitration – a practice currently used in Chile for setting prices in the water sector. Rather than submitting a single offer, each party...

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

In this work we propose a new model for spatial games. We present a definition of mobility in terms of the satisfaction an agent has with its spatial location. Agents compete for space through a non-cooperative game by using mixed strategies. We are particularly interested in studyig the...