Abstract Although most models of environmental compliance are based on a variation of the rational polluter model, regulated entities may not always intentionally decide to violate based on the relative costs and benefits of doing so. According to the complexity critique, a significant amount of...

Although most models of environmental compliance are based on a variation of the rational polluter model, regulated entities may not always intentionally decide to violate based on the relative costs and benefits of doing so. According to the complexity critique, a significant amount of...

We test several predictions of Gradstein's (1995) rent seeking model using an experimental design that includes a variable number of participants, cost heterogeneity, and an entry fee. Consistent with theoretical predictions, cost heterogeneity and the entry fee decrease the number of...

To analyze the effectiveness of punishment in inducing regulatory compliance, we modify a standard public goods experiment to include a financial penalty for free riding. The design allows us to vary both punishment probability and severity. We introduce the punishment mechanism in both a...