Structural econometric studies on auctions have mainly focused on the independentprivate value paradigm. In this paper, we are interested in the “opposite” caseknown as the pure common value model. More precisely, we restrict our attentionto a common value model defined by two functions :...

Quite often, a firm has to decide between investing in a safe project (``small'') where rewards and losses remain moderate and a risky alternative (``big'') where the rewards and the losses are larger. We study such a choice in a context where the probability of success depends both on the...

Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where...

Structural econometric studies on auctions have mainly focused on the independent private value paradigm. In this paper, we are interested in the 'opposite' case known as the pure common value model. More precisely, we restrict our attention to a class of common value models defined by three...

Ex post evaluations are crucial to measure the empirical effects of public policies. At the same time, one can wonder how much of these effects could be anticipated ex ante. We address this question for the bonus/malus policy introduced in France to reduce co<indice>2</indice> emissions. This policy was, in...

In markets where sellers are able to price discriminate, or the buyers to bargain, individuals receive discounts over the posted prices that are usually not observed by the econometrician. This paper considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model à la Berry et al. (1995) when...