Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments, and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their...

We report that 31% of the firms completing leveraged recapitalizations between 1985 and 1988 subsequently encounter financial distress. Following their recaps, the distressed firms exhibit (1) poor operating performance due largely to industry-wide problems, (2) surprisingly low proceeds from...

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outsideblockholders. In addition, we report decreases in diversification are associated...

We report a significant negative relation between the fractional equity ownership of top executives and the likelihood of top management turnover. In addition, the relation between prior firm performance and the likelihood of turnover is statistically insignificant for firms in which the top...

Following corporate spinoffs, unit boards are formed from scratch. We find that these ‘de novo' boards are smaller, more independent, include more outside directors with relevant industry expertise, and derive more industry expertise from outsiders than do industry and size-matched peers....