We study trust, reciprocity and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the...

The point made by this paper is quite simple : the input-output tables of the centrally planned economies, and in particular of the Soviet Union, systematically concealed an extremely inefficient structure of technology and production, one which is unable to reproduce itself at market generated...

This paper proposes a new mechanism linking trade and wage inequality in developing countries the quality-upgrading mechanism and investigates its empirical implications in panel data on Mexican manufacturing plants. In a model with heterogeneous plants and quality-differentiated goods, only the...

This is the text of the Raul Prebisch Lecture, given at UNCTAD IX in Johannesburg on 29th April 1996.

This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable...

This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions...

This paper deals with the design of Monte Carlo experiments in the context of cointegrated VAR models.