What incentives do countries have to repay loans? Do banks credibly punish borrowers that behave badly - and if so, how? Two explanations are commonly offered for why countries repay debts: (a) to preserve their reputation as a good borrower; or (b) to avoid direct sanctions, such as trade...

This paper studies changes in spreads on bank loans to developing countries during 1968-81. It found that a borrower's experience had a significant impact on spreads. Spreads started at high values at low levels of loan experience and decreased as experience increased. Spreads at...

Using a model that distinguishes between large money center banks and smaller regional banks, this paper shows that the percentage of a country's debt held by the large banks affects the secondary market price of that country's debt: the higher the concentration of the debt, the higher the...

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the role played by domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large external debts by developing countries between 1972 and 1981. The theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one the borrower is on its...