This paper examines the expected utility effects of adding one risk to another. In comparison to related works, it places fewer restrictions on utilities and more structure on risky asset returns. The paper, entailing little loss of generality, uses discrete variables defined on a common domain...

Contingent claims with payoffs depending on finitely many asset prices are modeled as a separable Hilbert space. Under fairly general conditions, including market completeness, it is shown that one may change measure to a reference measure under which asset prices are Gaussian and for which the...

We model firms' incentives to voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms and hypothesize that management's ability to extract private benefits, the need for external funds, and the ease with which a firm's assets may be monitored are important determinants of the level of governance....

This paper examines stochastic dominance relations among discrete random variables defined on a common integer domain. While these restrictions are minimal, they lead both to new theoretical results and to simpler proofs of existing ones. The new results, obtained for dominance criteria of any...

Most financial asset pricing models assume frictionless, competitive markets that imply the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Given the absence of arbitrage opportunities and complete asset markets, there exists a unique martingale measure that implies martingale pricing formulae and...

Over the last decade and a half, the Australian Universities have been subjected to a series of reforms introduced by the Australian Commonwealth Government. This paper discusses these reforms, subsequent policy changes, and their impact on the Australian university system. I will argue that the...

This paper studies corporate governance when a firm operates in imperfect markets. We derive firms’ decisions from utility maximization by individuals. If those involved in decisions are also consumers, the usual monopoly distortion is reduced. Corporate governance can effect the equilibrium...

We establish a dynamic currency attack model in the presence of a large player (LP) based on Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), which differs from most existing one-period static currency attack models. In an attack on a fixed exchange rate regime with a gradually overvaluing currency, both the...

We consider an economy in which firms' decisions are made by a collective decision of the shareholders. The main result shows that the simultaneous existence of an exchange equilibrium in the market for shares and a voting equilibrium in the internal decisions of firms. We present our results in...

This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm's decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions, a firmrm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable...