Financial incentives may increase performance on targeted activities and have unintended consequences for untargeted activities. An innovative pay-for-performance scheme was introduced for UK general practices in 2004. It incentivised particular quality indicators for targeted groups of...

In 2004 the UK government introduced a new ‘pay for performance’ element into the contract for family doctors (FDs). Its universal introduction with no pre-intervention data is not atypical of system-wide health reform but poses a considerable evaluation challenge. We derive estimates of its...

According to the relative income hypothesis, an individual's health depends on the distribution of income in a reference group, as well as on the income of the individual. We use data on 231,208 individuals in Great Britain from 19 rounds of the General Household Survey between 1979 and 2000 to...

The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...

The level and distribution of patient waiting times for elective treatments is a major concern in publicly-funded health care systems. Strict targets, which have specified maximum waiting times, have been introduced in the NHS over the last decade and have been criticized for distorting existing...