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We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but...
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We consider lotteries with reimbursements. It turns out that without loss of generality it is enough analyze lotteries where the winner gets her expenses reimbursed. We find that such a lottery (Sad-Loser) has multiple pure-strategy equilibria. We describe all equilibria and discuss their...
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This paper analyses an evolutionary version of the Public Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) in which agents can choose between imitation and best-reply decision rules. We describe conditions under which altruistic and spiteful (maximizing) behavior arise: these conditions are...
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Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce "cleverness" of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...
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