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When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 170-183

This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that, whenever a Tullock contest yields under-dissipation, the auctioneerʼs revenue can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049893

Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?

Bartling, Björn; Gesche, Tobias; Netzer, Nick - 2016

second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second- price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced … bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model …-price auctions in which human sellers are absent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663184

When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests

Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2010

This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities, where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that by fixing the number of tickets, thus setting a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008492668

The Price of Warm Glow

Lilley, Andrew; Slonim, Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

This paper presents a model and experimental evidence to explain the "volunteering puzzle" where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money when monetary donations are, ceteris paribus, more efficient for providing resources to charity. In the model agents receive heterogeneous utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959559

The price of warm glow

Lilley, Andrew; Slonim, Robert - In: Journal of Public Economics 114 (2014) C, pp. 58-74

This paper presents a model and experimental evidence to explain the “volunteering puzzle” where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money when monetary donations are, ceteris paribus, more efficient for providing resources to charity. In the model agents receive heterogeneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056150

The Price of Warm Glow

Lilley, Andrew; Slonim, Robert - 2013

This paper presents a model and experimental evidence to explain the volunteering puzzle where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money when monetary donations are, ceteris paribus, more efficient for providing resources to charity. In the model agents receive heterogeneous utility from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319510

‘Expressive’ Obligations in Public Good Games: Crowding-in and Crowding-out Effects.

Bernasconi, Michele; Corazzini, Luca; Marenzi, Anna - Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia - 2010

We study individual behaviour in a repeated linear public good experiment in which, in each period, subjects are required to contribute a minimum level and face a certain probability to be audited. Audited subjects who contribute less than the minimum level are convicted to pay the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008516721

The price of warm glow

Lilley, Andrew; Slonim, Robert - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009755326

Second-chance offers and buyer reputation : theory and evidence on auctions with default

Engelmann, Dirk; Frank, Jeff; Koch, Alexander K.; … - 2020

Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow "second …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237211

Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect

Dijk, Justin; Ansink, Erik; Soest, Daniël Pieter van - 2018

activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593