The construction of prediction intervals and regions and their probability content for nonlinear systems with nonparametric disturbances is considered. The semiparametric efficiency bound for estimating the probability content of a known interval (region) and estimators that attain the bound are...

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the incomplete information game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes...

This paper examines conditions which guarantee that the excess demand function of an exchange economy will satisfy the weak axiom in an open neighborhood of a given equilibrium price. This property ensures that the equilibrium is locally stable with respect to Walras' tatonnement. A related...

No abstract.

We extend the empirical likelihood method of estimation and inference proposed by Owen and others and demonstrate how it may be used in a general linear model context and to mitigate the impact of an ill-conditioned design matrix. A dual loss information theoretic estimating function is used...

No abstract.

No abstract.

After brief remarks on the history of modeling and inference techniques in economics and econometrics , attention is focused on the emergence of economic science in the 20th century. First, the broad objectives of science and the Pearson-Jeffreys' "unity of science" principle will be reviewed....

Sustainability of fiscal policies is one of the major issues in macroeconomics. Recently, in the United States, both Congress and Administration have proposed budgets designed to reduce the deficit and reach a zero debt target by the years 2002 and 2015, respectively. At the same time, European...

We consider a very simple competitive economy with infinitesimal agents and asymmetric information. We define a Common Knowledge (CK hereafter) Equilibrium as a price distribution compatible with CK of market clearing and rationality. At equilibrium, expectational mistakes and incorrect...