equilibria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games … offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number … explicitly consider the complexity of implementing a strategy, introduced in the literature on repeated games played by automata …

survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games. … offers and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of … consider the complexity of implementing a strategy, introduced in the literature on repeated games played by automata. It turns …

equilibria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games … offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number … explicitly consider the complexity of implementing a strategy, introduced in the literature on repeated games played by automata …

Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate a large number of equilibria, involving …, 1995) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are transaction/participation costs (Anderlini and Felli, 2001). We show … perpetual disagreement that survives in costly bargaining games. We also find that introducing small transaction costs to …

some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for … offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but …

This paper uses the complexity of non-competitive behaviour to provide a new justification for competitive equilibrium … heterogeneous sets of buyers and sellers and show that if the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences … done for sequential deterministic matching/bargaining models in which at any date either the identities of the matched …

We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is … bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and …

are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching and bargaining game should be the unique competitive equilibrium … this game. In this paper, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if the complexity costs of implementing … matching models. Thus the paper demonstrates that complexity costs might have a role in providing a justification for the …

We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is … bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and …