We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called ‘mass privatization’) and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

Dynamic panel data methods are used to estimate a growth model using data from 23 transition countries for the period 1990 to 2003. The estimating equation is augmented with country- and time-specific variables for methods of privatization and other factors potentially relevant to growth in...

In this paper we explore the ways in which institutions and networks influence entrepreneurial development in Russia. By utilizing new Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data collected in 2001, we investigate the effects of the weak institutional environment in Russia in terms of three...

"The paper evaluates the effects of privatization in the post-communist economies and China. In post-communist economies privatization to foreign owners results in a rapid improvement in performance of firms, while performance effects of privatization to domestic owners are less impressive and...