This paper investigates the market equilibrium and welfare effects of two-part tariff competition. When consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line, equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs if and only if the demand of the marginal consumer is equal to the average demand. Entry...

This short paper analyzes the effect of heterogeneity of markets in terms of income on the exclusion of markets under uniform price by considering linear demand curves in all markets. We show that more markets (and consumers) are excluded the higher are the inter-market income differences, and...

This note compares monopoly equilibrium outcomes with those of duopoly when firms price their products with two-part tariffs. Although a monopolistic firm never charges a lower marginal price than imperfectly competitive firms, it sets a lower entry fee under certain market conditions. In turn,...

This paper uses a simple diagram to compare two pricing strategies: price-quantity packages, and a two-part tariff from the monopoly and from the welfare points of view. It is shown that in the two-type consumer case when the monopoly is concerned, the price-quantity packages strategy dominates...

We employ a vertical differentiation model to examine the potential bias in pricing-to-market (PTM) results when using unit values aggregating differentiated products. Our results show that: i) false evidence of PTM ("pseudo PTM") is always found when using unit values, whether the law of one...

The paper analyzes the price, output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination triggered by the portfolio motive of a risk-averse monopolist facing random and potentially correlated market demands. It is shown that contrary to conventional wisdom, price discrimination can occur...

We derive bounds on the ratio of a monopolist's profit from third-degree price discrimination to that from uniform pricing. If a monopolist serves N independent markets, demand is continuous, and the cost function is superadditive, then the profit ratio is bounded by N. This bound is tight...

We present a model of dynamic monopoly pricing for a good that displays network effects. In contrast with the standard notion of a rational-expectations equilibrium, we model consumers as boundedly rational, and unable either to pay immediate attention to each price change, or to make accurate...

This pedagogical note explains how the same basic principle can be applied to explain the profit-maximizing behavior of a monopolist under both linear and nonlinear pricing by introducing an average price function. It is shown that optimal conditions under nonlinear pricing are similar to that...

This paper shows how a monopolist generally can increase its profits by offering a discount on its monopolized product if the customer agrees to buy a competitively supplied good from it at a price premium. The use of bundling to leverage market power has a long (and checkered) history in law...