We study the incentives of a social network to control two types of information circulating on its platform, namely display advertising by two quality-differentiated firms and "social information" (purchasing decisions shared among consumers). Consumers' choices are influenced by both of these...

In online social networks, social information, i.e., content generated and shared by users (e.g., past purchases), can be a substitute for sponsored advertising, which constitutes the network's main source of revenue. When will social information be let to spread freely over the platform? We...

In online social networks, social information, i.e., content generated and shared by users (e.g., past purchases), can be a substitute for sponsored advertising, which constitutes the network’s main source of revenue. When will social information be let to spread freely over the platform? We...

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

We study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily in the same way. Apart from obtaining the well known...