This paper examines multiple-bidder corporate control contests involving white knights, who are late-entry friendly bidders. An immediate white knight response to a hostile bid is met with a strong, negative market reaction. When the white knight and hostile bidder get into a quot;bidding...

In the first event-time analysis of the great merger wave of 1897-1903, we find that the consolidations created value for merger participants of 12% to 18%. We next find that the competitors suffered significant value losses inconsistent with conventional monopoly behavior (i.e., trust-induced...

We use event-time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900. For mergers with quot;prospectivequot; disclosures similar to today's, we find substantial value gains at announcement, implying participation by quot;outsidequot; shareholders despite the absence of...

In the first time-event analysis of the great merger wave of 1897-1903, we find that the consolidations created value for merger participants of 12% to 18%. We next find that the competitors suffered significant value losses inconsistent with conventional monopoly behavior (i.e., trust-induced...