Many Internet markets rely on ‘feedback systems’, essentially social networks of reputation, to facilitate trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. Market competition creates incentives that arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of these systems. We investigate how...

We compare how freshmen business students, graduate business students and experienced procurement managers perform on a simple inventory ordering task. We find that, qualitatively, managers exhibit ordering behavior similar to students, including biased ordering towards average demand....

In sequential equilibrium theory, reputation building is independent of whether the reputation builder is matched with one long-run player or a series of short run players. We observe, however, that reputation builders are significantly more challenged by long-run players in both laboratory...

We conducted a framed field experiment on eBay, and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior are robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. For buyers, the data strongly confirm the...

We investigate a three-person coalition game in which one bargainer, the builder, can propose and build a coalition over two stages. In equilibrium, coalition building ends with an efficient grand coalition, while the equilibrium path is contingent on the values of the two-person coalitions and...

Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct...

Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes...