We review important developments in Empirical Industrial Organization (IO) over the last three decades. The paper is organized around six topics: collusion, demand, productivity, industry dynamics, interfirm contracts, and auctions. We present models that are workhorses in empirical IO, and...

This paper studies the identification of players' preferences and beliefs in empirical applications of discrete choice games using experimental data. The experiment comprises a set of games with similar features (e.g., two-player coordination games) where each game has different values for the...

In a hub-and-spoke network, the profit function of an airline is supermodular with respect to the airline's own entry decisions for different city-pairs. This source of complementarity implies that a hub-and-spoke network can be an effective strategy for deterring the entry of competitors. This...

We derive marginal conditions of optimality (i.e., Euler equations) for a general class of Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) structural models. These conditions can be used to estimate structural parameters in these models without having to solve for or approximate value functions. This result...

This paper deals with a fundamental identification problem in the structural estimation of dynamic oligopoly models of market entry and exit. Using the standard datasets in existing empirical applications, there are three key components of a firm's profit function that are not separately...

The 1994 Riegle-Neal Act (RN) removed restrictions on branch-network expansion for banks in the United States. An important motivation was to facilitate geographic risk diversification (GRD). Using a factor model to measure banks' geographic risk, we show that RN expanded GRD possibilities in...

This paper deals with the identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs about other players' actions are biased, i.e., beliefs do not represent the probability distribution of the actual behavior of other players conditional on the information available. First, we show...