In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (1988) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers....

Proofs of some of the theorems in <a href=\"http://microeconomics.ca/michael_peters/internetauctionsrevisshort.pdf\"> Internet Auctions with Many Traders</a>

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogenous good, set reserve prices at their own independent second-price auctions. Each buyer has a private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they...

This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2001) in a market where traders values are interdependent. It is shown that under reasonable conditions this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that...

This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the...