In this paper we characterize the equilibrium in a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct the search by announcing wages and employment probabilities for the applicants. All workers/jobs are homogeneous and free entry of firms determines the number of jobs. The...

We study a large market with directed search and signaling. Each seller chooses an investment that determines the quality of the good which is the seller's private information. A seller also chooses the price of the good and the number of selling sites. After observing sellers' choices of prices...

We study a large market with directed search and signaling. Each seller chooses an investment that determines the quality of the good which is the seller's private information. A seller also chooses the price of the good and the number of selling sites. After observing sellers' choices of prices...

To answer the question in the title, this paper characterizes the socially efficient organization of the market with search frictions. The efficient organization depends on the relative elasticity in the supply between the two sides of the market, the costs of participating in the market and...

We compare the efficiency of price posting and bargaining in a market with search frictions and signaling of goods quality.We focus on the tradeoff between two roles of each pricing mechanism: directing search and reducing asymmetric information. This tradeoff has largely been ignored in the...