Andreoni (1998) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be...

<link rid="b9">Esteban and Ray (2001)</link> model an increasing marginal cost of effort in providing a public good. If the marginal cost of contribution function has an elasticity greater than 1, then the level of provision is increasing in group size, regardless of the degree of rivalry of the public good. We...

We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the <link rid="b8">Morgan (2000)</link> lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival...

<link rid="b30">Rodrik (1995)</link> notes that trade regimes tend to be biased towards import protection, while the standard political economy models either yield no prediction on the bias of the trade regime or predict, counterfactually, a bias towards the export sector. This constitutes an important shortcoming in...

In the standard model of a rent-seeking contest, firms optimally employ resources in an attempt to win the contest and obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some fixed, exogenous per-unit cost. In many real-world rent-seeking...