We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …

.e. a contest against other rent-seekers). At the aggregate level, rent-seeking reduces the available amount of labor in the …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of …

disadvantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to freeride is larger in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is fiercer. Both effects lower the marginal utility of effort …

advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of …

that increases wealth or through a contest in which unproductive (rent-seeking) effort is used to redistribute wealth …

information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a …

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in …