The paper outlines an exchangeable non-Bayesian model of preference generalizing the Savage/de Finetti classic model of subjective expected utility preference with an exchangeable prior. The treatment is informal, and the emphasis is on motivation and potential applications rather than on...

The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and...

The concept of unforeseen events is considered as a part of a hypothesis of uncertain future. The applications of the consequences of the hypothesis in utility and prospect theories are reviewed. Partially unforeseen events and their role in forecasting are analyzed. Preliminary preparations are...

This paper develops a utility model for evaluating lotteries. In estimating utility, risk averse people use an asymmetric loss function. Expected utility is seen as a special case that is a good approximation in some cases. The model resolves several paradoxes and makes easily falsifiable...

This paper develops a utility model for evaluating lotteries. In estimating utility, risk averse people use an asymmetric loss function. Expected utility is seen as a special case that is a good approximation of the general case in some cases. The model resolves several paradoxes and makes...

Decision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has generally been studied in the domain of risky choice, and many theories of...

In this paper, we propose an interpretation of the Hilbert space method used in quantum theory in the context of decision making under uncertainty. For a clear comparison we will stay as close as possible to the framework of SEU suggested by Savage (1954). We will use the Ellsberg (1961) paradox...

We run an experiment that gives subjects the opportunity to hedge away ambiguity in an Ellsberg-style experiment. Subjects are asked to make two bets on the same draw from an ambiguous urn, with a coin flip deciding which bet is paid. By modifying the timing of the draw, coin flip, and decision,...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...

Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (Economic Theory, 48:341-375, 2011) have recently axiomatised preferences in the presence of ambiguity as Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preferences. We investigate the problem of Arrovian aggregation of MBA preferences...