This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of the Smooth Ambiguity decision model developed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). A key feature of the model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs,...

The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that peoples belief over uncertainevents might not be representable by subjective probability. We relate this paradox to other commonly observed anomalies, suchas a rejection of the backward induction prediction in the one-shot Ultimatum Game. We argue that the...

We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of...

This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective proba- bilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs - second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and systemati-...

We axiomatize a model of decision under objective ambiguity or imprecise risk. The decision maker forms a subjective (non necessarily additive) belief aboutthe likelihood of probability distributions and computes the average expected utility of a given act with respect to this second order...

We examine a variety of preference-based definitions of ambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model.  We first consider the definition proposed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) based on the classic Ellsberg two-urn paradox (Ellsberg (1961)), and show that it...

Ellsberg's experiment involved a gamble with no ambiguity (N) and a gam- ble where the prize that could be won is objectively known, but the winning probability depends on the (ambiguous) urn's composition (P). We extend this by including a gamble where the winning probability is objectively...

We consider two plausible and even natural examples of ambiguity aversion: the classical Ellsberg (1961) two-color paradox and a variant of the Machina (2009) reflection example. We extend the results of Baillon et al. (2011) and demonstrate that these two examples challenge the descriptive...

We study the relation between ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. To this end, we introduce a novel denition of hedging which applies to objective lotteries as well as to uncertain acts, and we use it to dene a novel axiom that captures a preference for hedging which generalizes the one...

In this paper we elicit preferences for the classical three-color Ellsberg Paradax employing three different methods, choices, minimal selling prices and maximal buying prices. The resulting data reveal a high frequency of preference reversals which have not been analyzed before in choice under...