The final step in the proof of Proposition 1 (p.311) of Mukerji and Tallon (2003) may not hold in generalbecause $\varepsilon0$ in the proof cannot be chosen independently of $w,z$. We point out by a counterexample that the axioms they impose are too weak for Proposition 1. We introduce a...

Savage motivated his Sure-Thing Principle b y arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if an event did not obtain, then it should be preferred overall. The idea that it should be possible to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has...

This paper axiomatizes Cobb-Douglas preferences under uncertainty. First, we extend the original Trockel (Econ Lett 30:7–10, <CitationRef CitationID="CR46">1989</CitationRef>)’s axiomatic foundation to a general state space framework based on the Strong Homotheticity Axiom, obtaining also the incomplete case a la Bewley (Decis Econ...</citationref>

The paper outlines an exchangeable non-Bayesian model of preference generalizing the Savage/de Finetti classic model of subjective expected utility preference with an exchangeable prior. The treatment is informal, and the emphasis is on motivation and potential applications rather than on...

The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and...

The concept of unforeseen events is considered as a part of a hypothesis of uncertain future. The applications of the consequences of the hypothesis in utility and prospect theories are reviewed. Partially unforeseen events and their role in forecasting are analyzed. Preliminary preparations are...

Machina (2009, 2012) lists a number of situations where standard models of ambiguity aversion are unable to capture plausible features of ambiguity attitudes. Most of these problems arise in choice over prospects involving three or more outcomes. We show that the recursive non-expected utility...

Decision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has generally been studied in the domain of risky choice, and many theories of...

Machina (2009, 2012) lists a number of situations where standard models of ambiguity aversion are unable to capture plausible features of ambiguity attitudes. Most of these problems arise in choice over prospects involving three or more outcomes. We show that the recursive non-expected utility...

We study the two-color problem by Ellsberg (1961) with the modification that the decision maker draws twice with replacement and a different color wins in each draw. The 50-50 risky urn turns out to have the highest risk conceivable among all prospects including the ambiguous one, while all...