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The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Mailath, George J.; Obara, Ichiro; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Penn Economics Department

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359509

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Matthews, Steven A.; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 2 (2002) 1

Abstract We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589010

Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

Mailath, George J. (contributor); … - In: Contributions to theoretical economics 2 (2002) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001739666

Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Matthews, Steven A.; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001565875

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J. - 2001

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012742460