This paper considers the continued relevance of competition for utility regulation, especially in the context of Britain. It does so in three steps. First, it considers the context in which RPI-X entered the policy debate and became a central aspect of subsequent utility reforms. Second, it...

Developing and transitional economies have adopted and implemented “RPI-X” or “incentive based regulation” over the past few decades, building on the reforms in the UK and elsewhere. However, for incentive based regulation to deliver the desired outcomes it needs to be implemented in a...

This paper considers the evolution of the British model of independent utility regulation from the publication of the 1983 Littlechild Report on telecom regulation. Over the last ten years, the model has faced some threats to its pro-competition emphasis, notably in energy regulation and...

This paper provides a perspective from two economic regulators on the way in which economic regulation in the UK has developed over time. Regulation has delivered great benefits, but its development has been at odds with expectations at the time of privatisation. In particular, effective...

This article examines the impact the UK regulatory model has had in developing and transition countries in the three decades since its inception. It presents data linked to three key features of the model, namely independent regulatory institutions; focus on competition; and greater efficiency...

This article considers whether African utility regulators can draw useful lessons from the British experience over the past thirty years. We focus on three features that are considered key properties of the British regulatory model: price-cap incentive regulation, independent regulatory agencies...

The present paper aims to provide some thoughts on the incentive regulation and investment decisions in the gas sector with particular attention to the third party access (TPA) exemption. Open and non-discriminatory access to the networks by those who do not own the physical network...

Incentive regulation is designed to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops...

This article briefly reviews Competition in Telecommunications by Laffont andTirole (2000); it presents the major conclusions of the book and corrects certain errors. In addition, this article treats related topics, some specific to the US telecommunications industry. In US telecommunications...

The Massachusetts public utility commission has pursued policies to promote competition and efficient pricing in telecommunications since the divestiture of AT&T in 1984. As part of this effort, the Massachusetts Commission approved incentive regulation for AT&T and Verizon - the only two...