Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed … or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to … any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary …

Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed … or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to … any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary …

Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed … or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these theree cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to … any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary …

fact become a very weak one. For what it matters, targeting tends to be associated with higher levels of redistribution …There is a long-standing controversy over the question of whether targeting social transfers towards the bottom part of … empirical underpinning of this claim is a strong inverse relationship at the country level between social transfer targeting and …

The last decade has seen a sharp increase in interest in the possible existence of a Paradox of Redistribution (PoR …) whereby narrow targeting of social transfers aimed at increasing their redistributive (poverty) impact has the perverse effect …