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Jarman, Ben - 2009

Auctions are an ancient economic institution. Since Vickrey (1961), the development of auction theory has lead to an … explaining their enduring popularity. Given the pervasiveness of auctions, the question of how a seller should engineer the rules …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009480046

Design of Discrete Auction

Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut - 2010

sealed-bid and clock auctions. We find that the efficient bid levels in the sealed-bid second-price auction may be non … upcoming 3G spectrum auction, rather than the seemingly superior HRB auction. Chapter 3: Discrete Clock Auctions: An … Experimental Study We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009450772

Mechanism Design with Partial Revelation

Hyafil, Nathanael - 2008

With the emergence of the Internet as a global structure for communication and interaction,many “business to consumer” and “business to business” applications have migrated online,thus increasing the need for software agents that can act on behalf of people, institutions orcompanies with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009455276

The Quantitative View of Myerson Regularity

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016

In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431257

Optimal procurement with quality concerns

Lopomo, Giuseppe; Persico, Nicola; Villa, Alessandro T. - 2022

. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013364542

Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information

Reuter, Marco - 2023

I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder's valuation. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014446315

Outsourcing via reverse auction with a built‐in menu of change orders

Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Bulletin of Economic Research 75 (2022) 1, pp. 202-208

Many firms invent and design products while outsourcing their production to independent contractors. We consider a dominant strategy mechanism that selects a contractor using a reverse auction, combined with a menu of permitted change orders from which the contractor can choose after updated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503463

Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work

Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2018

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787979

Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310273

Implementing Efficient Market Structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010314843