In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and...

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share...

Like avoiding labor protection laws via foreign subcontractors, banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who, similar to properly incentivized subcontractors, can gain by deceiving those in the role of proper...

In three-party ultimatum games, the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, which increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining...

There is overwhelming evidence of reciprocal behavior, driven by intentions. However, the role of consequences is less clear cut. Experimentally manipulating how efficient trust and reciprocity can be in deterministic and uncertain environments allows us to study how payoff consequences of trust...

We experimentally investigate how proposers in the Ultimatum Game behave when their cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure and cognitive load. In a dual-system perspective, when proposers are cognitively constrained and thus their deliberative capacity is reduced, their offers are...

One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal–agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games, depends on which player yields first. If responders conceded first by accepting low offers, proposers, would not need to learn to offer more. Play would thus converge toward unequal sharing. If proposers,...

We apply a procedurally fair rule to a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the...

We analyze the effect of “milestones” on reaching a long-term target, which if missed implies dramatic payoff risks. In our experiment, a cumulative threshold public goods game, milestones are captured by intermediate contribution targets on the way to the final target. Missing the final...