Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All abandoned the systems between 1921 and 1930. Scholars debate the costs and benefits of these policy experiments. New data drawn from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit...

Abstract This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a...

In this paper we show that deposit insurance can increase the probability of systemic banking crisis, even though it is optimally designed and its premium is risk related. This is driven by the possibility of contagious bank runs. We prove that contagion only occurs if the correlation between...

There are, at least, seven aspects relating to financial regulation where the recent, and still current, financial turmoil has thrown up issues for discussion. These include: 1. The scale and scope of deposit insurance; 2. Bank insolvency regimes, also known as prompt corrective action'; 3. Money...

The "market discipline" of off-balance sheet banking activities (OBSA) has been reexamined by employing contingent claims valuation techniques to derive implied asset variances from bank equity and deposit insurance, and from risk-premia for bank subordinated debt. Specifically implied asset...

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 led to extraordinary government intervention in firms and markets. The scope and depth of government action rivaled that of the Great Depression. Many traded markets experienced dramatic declines in liquidity leading to the existence of conditions normally...

The "market discipline" of off-balance sheet banking activities (OBSA) has been reexamined by employing contingent claims valuation techniques to derive implied asset variances from bank equity and deposit insurance, and from risk-premia for bank subordinated debt. Specifically implied asset...

This paper provides a macroeconomic perspective for government interventions in banking crises. We illustrate how vulnerabilities of the banking sector may build up over time and thus destabilize a banking system. A crisis occurs when a large number of banks fail to meet capital requirements or...

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data...