Speculative Attacks can be modeled as a coordination game with multiple equilibria if the state of the economy is common knowledge. With private information there is a unique equilibrium. This raises the question whether public information may be destabilizing by allowing for self-fulfilling...

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure, which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken...

This paper presents results from an experiment studying a two-person 4x4 pure coordination game. We seek to identify a labeling of actions that induces subjects to select all options with the same probability. Such a display of actions must be free from salient properties that might be used by...

We study the convergence properties of learning in social and economic networks. We characterize the effect of network structure on the long-run convergent behaviour and on the time of convergence to steady state. Agents play a repeated game governed by two underlying behavioural rules; they are...

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium, and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may enhance coordination substantially. Besides attracting the players’ choices to itself, such...

This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place....

Farmers’ technology adoption in electric irrigation has recently been analyzed as a coordination problem. To study how the Pareto-inferior equilibrium, farmers are trapped in, can be overcome we have developed a framed field experiment. Leadership and group size are varied in a full factorial...

We assess the impact of cognitive abilities on withdrawal decisions in a bank-run game. In our setup, depositors choose sequentially between withdrawing or keeping their funds deposited in a common bank. They may observe previous decisions depending on the information structure. Theoretically,...