The key to an understanding of the TV industry is the market for TV advertising. We present a model of this market that also encompasses the product markets and the viewer market. Because viewers dislike commercials, there is congestion in advertising, and TV channels offer complementary goods...

Under the current market structure in the TV industry advertising prices are typically set by TV channels while viewer prices are set by distributors (e.g., cable operators). The latter implies that the distributors partly internalize the competition between the TV channels, since they take into...

This paper presents a theory of vertically interrelated markets of identical fixed size under implementation of positive indirect network effects. By introducing two Salop circles, a two-sided market model is provided, where intermediaries of differentiated copyrights for intellectual property,...

We compare the advertising intensity and content of programming in a market withcompeting media platforms. With pay-tv, media platforms have two sources of revenues,advertising revenues and revenues from viewers. With free-to-air, media platformsreceive all revenues from advertising. We show...

We measure the welfare consequences of endogenous quality choice in imperfectly competitive markets. We introduce the concept of a "quality markup" and measure the relative welfare consequences of market power over price and quality. For U.S. paid-television markets during 1997-2006, we find...

We explore the consequence of quality unpredictability for the welfare benefit of new products, using recent developments in recorded music as our context. Digitization has expanded consumption opportunities by giving consumers access to the "long tail" of existing products, rather than simply...

The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses partici- pation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

The entire system of scholarly communication is in transition, with the emergence of new markets, services and players. Given what we know about this digital transition, the technical, financial and legal parameters of a future model of publishing scientific information are predictable. The...

While cities understandably want oversight over some aspects of installing this infrastructure, such as digging up neighborhood streets, there is no economic rationale for local franchising of video services. The need to obtain a franchise represents little more than a barrier to entry....

We study how digital platforms can choose competitive strategies to influence the number of multihoming consumers. Platforms compete for consumers and advertisers. A platform earns a premium from advertising to singlehomers, as it is a gatekeeper to these consumers. Competitive strategies...