We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These executives obtain wealth increases with a median of $4 to $5 million and a mean of $8 to $11 million, roughly in line with the permanent income streams that they sacrifice. CEOs receive lower financial...

After an initial public offering, most existing shareholders are subject to a lock-up period in which they cannot sell their shares for a prespecified time. At the end of the lock-up, there is a permanent and large shift in the supply of shares. The lock-up expiration is a particularly...

We find that executives sell shares of previously owned stock after receiving equity-based incentive compensation, counteracting boards' attempts to tie their wealth to firm value. Executives sell stock during years in which they receive new stock options or restricted stock, and some evidence...

We examine whether the value loss from diversification affects takeover and break-up probabilities. We estimate diversification's value effect by imputing stand-alone values for individual business segments and find that firms with greater value losses are more likely to be taken over. Moreover,...

We estimate the effect that value-destroying diversification has on the probabilities of takeover and break-up. Recent papers show that unrelated diversification decreased firm value, that the value loss is reversible, that bidder gains from takeovers are higher when their targets' managers have...

This paper examines the use of foreign currency derivatives by Samp;P 500 nonfinancial firms during 1992-1993 and the potential impact on exchange-rate risk. The extent to which firms use foreign currency derivatives is positively related to the ratios of foreign sales to total sales and total...

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross- sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and...

We show that there is a negative relation between leverage and future growth at the firm level and, for diversified firms, at the segment level. Further, this negative relation between leverage and growth holds for firms with low Tobin's q, but not for high-q firms or firms in high-q industries....

We investigate the impact of stock-based compensation on managerial ownership. We find that equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lower-ownership managers, but higher-ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When executives exercise...

The authors study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, they find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership...