We use credit-arbitrage asset-backed commercial paper vehicles as a laboratory to empirically examine financial institutions' motivations to take bad-tail systematic risk. By comparing the characteristics of global banks that sponsored credit-arbitrage vehicles prior to the global financial...

Now in prospect is a major revision of international bank capital regulations that would embody recent advances in credit risk measurement and management. Previous regulations have been simpler in structure, with a primary goal of getting capital requirements right on average, and thus have...

Over the last twenty years, the consensus view of systemic risk in the financial system that emerged in response to the banking crises of the 1930s and before has lost much of its relevance. This view held that the main systemic problem is runs on solvent banks leading to bank panics. But...

We analyze the impact of bad-tail risks on managerial pay functions, especially the decision to pay managers in stock or in options. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that options are often a superior vehicle for limiting managerial incentives to take bad-tail risks while providing...

We offer a model and evidence that private debtholders play a key role in setting the endogenous asset value threshold below which corporations declare bankruptcy. The model, in the spirit of Black and Cox (1976), implies that the recovery rate at emergence from bankruptcy on all of the firm's...

Resampling implementation of a stress-scenario approach to estimating portfolio default loss distributions is proposed as the basis for estimates of the appropriate absolute level of economic capital allocations for portfolio credit risk. Estimates are presented for stress scenarios of varying...

Estimates of average default probabilities for borrowers assigned to each of a financial institution's internal credit risk rating grades are crucial inputs to portfolio credit risk models. Such models are increasingly used in setting financial institution capital structure, in internal control...

Firms with publicly-issued debt typically obtain a large fraction of their debt finance from private lenders. We show that public debt can complement private lender monitoring, in effect making private debt contracts more complete. Public debt carries few control rights, leaving bondholders...

We offer evidence that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are economically significantly smaller in Europe than in the U.S., other things equal. Differences in borrower, loan and lender characteristics associated with equilibrium mechanisms suggested in the...