This paper introduces uncertainty regarding the proportion of informed traders in a rational expectation equilibrium model with asymmetric information. The proportion uncertainty dramatically changes the properties of the resulting equilibrium. First, it may generate multiple nonlinear rational...

We study price formation in securities markets, using the sequential trade framework of Glosten and Milgrom [7]. This paper makes one basic methodological advance over previous research on sequential securities trading: we allow traders to choose from n trade sizes in a multi-period market,...

We study the properties of rational expectation equilibria (REE) in dynamic asset pricing models with heterogeneously informed agents. We show that under mild conditions the state space of such models in REE can be infinite dimensional. This result indicates that the domain of analytically...

We consider a noisy rational expectations equilibrium in a multi-asset economy populated by informed and uninformed investors, and noise traders. Informed investors privately observe an aggregate risk factor affecting the probabilities of different states of the economy. Uninformed investors...

Accommodating asymmetric information in a dynamic asset pricing model is technically challenging due to the problems associated with higher-order expectations. That is, rational investors are forced into a situation where they must forecast the forecasts of other agents. In a dynamic setting,...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to model asymmetric information and study the profitability of venture capital (VC) backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Our mixtures approach endogenously separates IPOs into differentiated groups based on their returns’ determinants. We also...

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer ' the seller ' follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing a symmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If...

Environmental policy often has to be devised under informational constraints, like uncertainty and asymmetric information. We consider an environmental policy that aims at reducing the welfare losses caused by asymmetric information while being sufficiently simple for implementation. In this...