We study control contests under asymmetric information. Using a mechanism design approach, we fully characterize the optimal control contest mechanism. The optimal mechanism requires increasing the number of shares owned by the incumbent insider if he remains in control, while giving him a...

We identify welfare-optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation, entry and imperfect competition. When the social planner may impose a compulsory license, optimal royalties either blockade imitation, facilitating unregulated monopoly, or yield an aggregate-zero-profit "efficient"...

We estimate demand for residential broadband using high-frequency data from subscribers facing a three-part tariff. The three-part tariff makes data usage during the billing cycle a dynamic problem; thus, generating variation in the (shadow) price of usage. We provide evidence that subscribers...

Past work has shown that asymmetric information and asymmetric ownership affect the possibility of efficient dissolution of partnerships. We show that \textit{control} is also a central determinant of the possibility of efficient implementation. We demonstrate this point by analyzing a benchmark...

We analyze subscriber usage data from an Internet Service Provider that sells service using three-part tariff and unlimited plans. Subscribers facing three-part tariffs have lower average usage than subscribers on unlimited plans, and differences among heavy users explain nearly all the overall...

In a bilateral relationship where the supplier of an intermediate good has to make a relationship-specific investment but cannot write or enforce a complete contract, the standard hold-up problem of underinvestment arises. We show that this problem is aggravated when the buyer is located in a...