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This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for a general class of N-person, binary-choice games. Applications include: participation games, voting, market entry, binary step-level public goods games, the volunteer's dilemma, the El Farol problem, etc. A simple graphical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802015
In two-stage bargaining games with alternating offers, the amount of the pie that remains after a rejection is what the first player should offer to the second player, since the second player can capture this remainder in the final (ultimatum) stage. Fairness considerations will reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802018
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802019
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal [Bala, V., Goyal, S., 2000. A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68, 1131-1230] model of network formation with decay and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008483529
This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530381
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005127286
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005128117
The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129832
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005058469
Multi-license ascending auctions have been criticized because they allow bidders to reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, it has been argued that the ascending auction is a suitable format for a seller who wants to exploit preemptive motives. Incumbent firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090871