This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms...

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms observed in practice and the...

Using data from the Wisconsin Entrepreneurial Climate Study, we study the sources of firms' finance during the very early stages of their lives. Our focus is the evolution of the mix of financial capital from 'insiders' and 'outsiders' as firms age. We find that at the beginning of firms' life...

This paper focuses on the dynamic capital structure of firms: Why firms choose very different capital structure in different stages of their life-cycles? In a model of optimal financial contracting, we investigate whether subsequent financing decisions

Enterprises, small or large, rely heavily on long-term financing arrangements to fund their operations. However, it has proved difficult for financial theory to justify the use of long-term contracts when the manager has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows, and when it is...

This paper investigates the distribution of equity ownership between entrenched corporate insiders and dispersed outsiders when management has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows and when it is costly for equity holders to verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing for a third...

This paper investigates the design of the control rights and the maturity of securities when management has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows, and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party, such as court, to verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing. By endogenizing...

This article develops a theory of mergers and divestitures. The motivation stems from inability to finance marginally profitable projects as stand-alones due to agency problems. A conglomerate merger is a technology that allows these projects to survive a period of distress. If profitability...

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies. We identify an emerging market economy by the political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization mechanisms. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of privatization mechanisms...