We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

We study the existence of cost monotonic selections of the core in economies with several public goods. Under quasilinear utilities there is a cost inonotonic core selection mechanism if and only if the agents order the bundles of public goods equally. If this is indeed the case, any such...

The paper studies technology policy within a version of Jones's (1995) non-scale R&D-based growth framework that incorporates imitation of foreign techniques. The transitional dynamics of the model can account for some well-known empirical regularities regarding the relationship between the...

This paper presents a macro-econometric model for medium- and long-term nominal interest rates, assuming heterogeneous economic agents in the market that use different and limited sets of information. It also shows the empirical results obtained from US and UK data, comparing the performance of...

We extend Myerson's (1981) model by allowing for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In such extension the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds and the optimal allocation rule remains the same. Hence, the optimal auction can be implemented with an appropriate reserve price. Nonetheless,...

The "Regret Theory" [Loomes & Sugden (1987)] predicts that indifference lines fan out from a point to the southwest of the origin of the Marschak-Machina triangle. This fact is a consequence of regret aversion. In this paper we present the results of an experiment which shows that the...

I estimate how intra-household bargaining affects gay and lesbian couples¿ labor supplies, investigating their similarity to heterosexual decision-making, in a collective household framework. Data from the 2000 US Census shows that couples of all types exhibit a significant response to...

We provide an axiomatic foundation of the expected utility preferences over lotteries on roles in simple superadditive games represented by the two main power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, when they are interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Our...

This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly well: They can win with higher probability than better...

Firms willing to enter a market with a new product often face the problem that the market does notknow its quality. Selling through a retailer might avoid excessive entry costs by renting thereputation of an incumbent. The incumbent can apply excusive dealing clauses to his retailer. Weshow that...